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Abstract. Password is the foremost mean to achieve data and computer security. Hence,
choosing a strong password which may withstand dictionary attacks is crucial in estab-
lishing the security of the underlying system. In order to ensure that strong passwords
are chosen and that they are periodically updated, system administrators often rely on
password auditors to filter weak password digests. Several tools aimed at preventing di-
gest misuse have been designed to aid auditors in their task. We however show that the
objective remains a far cry as these tools essentially reveal the digests corresponding to
weak passwords. As a case study, we discuss the issues with Blackhash, and develop
the notion of Private Password Auditing — a mechanism that does not require a system
administrator to reveal password digests to an external auditor and symmetrically the dic-
tionaries remain private to the auditor. We further present constructions based on Private
Set Intersection and its variant, and evaluate a proof-of-concept implementation against
real-world dictionaries.
Keywords: Password, Auditing, Password cracking, Private Set Intersection, Private Set
Intersection Cardinality.
1 Introduction
Passwords are pervasive to data and computer security. However, despite their utmost reliance
on passwords, users often deliberately choose one which is common and easy to remember.
This has been confirmed by the data leakages over the recent past1. In addition to revealing
the password habits of users, these leakages have further increased the number of dictionar-
ies containing common and weak passwords. These dictionaries form the basis of password
cracking tools such as John the Ripper2 and Hashcat3. Furthermore, Narayanan et al. [5] show
that as long as passwords remain human-memorable, they are vulnerable to “smart dictionary
attacks” even when the space of potential passwords is large.
The advances made in password crackers and the ever evolving dictionaries have forced
system administrators to take drastic measures to protect their users. Password auditing is one
of them. System administrators periodically audit system passwords to inform users to change
their passwords in case they are found to be weak (with respect to the available dictionaries
and the cracking tools). Typically, they extract password digests from systems and then they
themselves perform an internal audit. Another alternative is to outsource this task to an expert




privileged access to several sensitive user information, revealing the weakness of a user pass-
word to him may lead to massive security breach. Furthermore, considering the expertise of
external auditors and to ensure transparency of the process, the latter approach to auditing is
often preferred.
Several proprietary tools such as l0phtcrack.com as well as free softwares have been
developed to aid password auditors. Most of these auditing tools go beyond determining whether
a password is weak. For instance, they also allow the auditor to verify whether the passwords
are periodically changed by the users. Some free softwares, a notable example being Black-
hash [1], are essentially restricted to knowing whether system passwords are weak. However,
these tools can be easily adapted to perform a full scale auditing.
While tools capable of performing full scale auditing require the password digests of all the
users, some specialized tools such as Blackhash claim to filter weak passwords without having
access to the full digests. Contrary to the claims, we highlight that these password auditing
tools, in particular Blackhash require the system administrator to reveal the password digests
corresponding to easy-to-crack passwords. Eventually, these tools require the administrator
to reveal weak passwords. A malicious auditor may use these passwords for his own benefit
before reporting its potential weakness to the administrator.
To this end, we present Private Password Auditing: a mechanism that allows a user or a
system administrator to filter weak passwords from the password digests without revealing
the digests to the auditor. Furthermore, the dictionaries used for auditing remain private to the
auditor. The presented tool relies on Private Set Intersection [4] and Private Set Intersection
Cardinality [3]. We finally evaluate the performance of a proof-of-concept implementation of
the tool. This leads us to the conclusion that in the general auditing scenario, private password
auditing tools are practical.
2 Password Auditing
Password auditing may be considered as a preventive mechanism to resist password crack-
ing tools. In its restricted form, password auditing consists of determining whether any of the
system passwords are weak and hence susceptible to cracking tools. This is essentially per-
formed with the help of an auditor who uses dictionary based tools to filter weak digests. In the
following we present existing approaches to password auditing of this kind and analyze their
weaknesses.
2.1 Naive Approach
A naive approach to password audit would typically involve extracting password digests from
systems and then sending them to a third-party security auditor or an in-house security team.
The auditor relying on tools such as John the Ripper or Hashcat may easily uncover potentially
weak passwords. However, such an approach ensues serious risks. The password digests may
be lost or stolen from the security team. Furthermore, a rogue security team member may
secretly make copies of the password digests and may mount pass-the-hash attacks. Worse,
some of these digests may correspond to easy-to-crack passwords. The auditor may recover in
clear the weak passwords and use it for malicious purposes before reporting it to the system
administrator.
Consequently, it is hard to guarantee that the password digests are handled and disposed
of securely and that access to the digests is not abused. Indeed, only the system administrator
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and his team should have access to password digests. Extracting the digests and giving them to
someone else fundamentally compromises the security of the system.
2.2 Auditing Without Full Hashes
This kind of auditing checks system digests for weak passwords without actually having access
to the full digests. A notable example is Blackhash [1], which is based on Bloom filters [2]. In
the following we briefly describe Bloom filters and in the sequel we present Blackhash.
Bloom Filter. Bloom filter [2] is a space and time efficient probabilistic data structure that
provides an algorithmic solution to the set membership query problem, which consists in de-
termining whether an item belongs to a predefined set.
Classical Bloom filter as presented in [2] essentially consists of k independent hash func-
tions {h1, . . . , hk}, where {hi : {0, 1}∗ → [0,m− 1]}k and a bit vector z = (z0, . . . , zm−1)
of size m initialized to 0. Each hash function uniformly returns an index in the vector z. The
filter z is incrementally built by inserting items of a predefined set S . Each item x ∈ S is
inserted into a Bloom filter by first feeding it to the hash functions to retrieve k indices of z.
Finally, insertion of x in the filter is achieved by setting the bits of z at these positions to 1.
In order to query if an item y ∈ {0, 1}∗ belongs to S, we check if y has been inserted into
the Bloom filter z. Achieving this requires y to be processed (as in insertion) by the same hash
functions to obtain k indexes of the filter. If any of the bits at these indexes is 0, the item is not
in the filter, otherwise the item is present (with a small false positive probability).
The space and time efficiency of Bloom filter comes at the cost of false positives. If |S| =
n, i.e. n items are to be inserted into the filter and the space available to store the filter is m











Blackhash [1] is a tool for restricted auditing of passwords, i.e. check for weak password
digests in the system file without having access to the full digests. It works by building a
Bloom filter from the system password digests. The system manager extracts the password
digests and then uses Blackhash to build the filter. The filter is saved to a file, then compressed
and given to the audit team. The audit team maintains a set of dictionaries of weak passwords
against which the password digests are to be tested. Upon reception of the filter, the auditor
simply checks for each entry of the dictionary, whether or not it is present in the filter. If weak
passwords are found to be present in the filter, the security team creates a weak filter of these
passwords and sends it back to the system manager. Finally, the system manager tests the weak
filter against the system digests to identify individual users with weak passwords.
Bloom filter parameters. The filter size m to store the system digests is 226 bits, and can
accommodate up to 1 million password digests. The number of hash functions k = 2, and the
hash functions employed are either MD4 or MD5. Developers claim to achieve a false positive
probability of 0.0008. Clearly, these parameters are not optimal. To achieve a false positive
probability of 0.0008 for 1 million digests, one would need a filter of size 14, 842, 031 ≈ 224
bits.
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Issues with Blackhash. Developers claim that Blackhash does not reveal password digests
to the auditor. Hence, it constitutes a better and secure tool compared to the naive approach.
Contrary to the claim, using a Bloom filter of password digests instead of full digests does not
improve user’s privacy. The most serious issue with Blackhash is that the auditor while finding
the weak passwords with the help of dictionaries actually retrieves the weak passwords in clear.
To paraphrase, Blackhash requires the system administrator to reveal the weak passwords.
Furthermore, due to the false positive probability of Bloom filters, strong passwords might get
detected as being weak. Keeping the false positive probability extremely low however comes
at the cost of space/time required to store/query the filter.
3 Private Password Auditing (PPA)
In the previous section, we highlighted the issues with Blackhash. The most serious one being
that, it requires the administrator to reveal weak passwords. To this end, we propose Private
Password Auditing (PPA), a mechanism which does not require a user or the administrator to
reveal password digests while auditing. Two scenarios may be considered where PPA may play
important role:
– There is a system administrator with a list of system password digests and wishes to know
the ones which correspond to easy-to-crack passwords. Once these passwords are identi-
fied, the respective owners are contacted and asked to change their passwords.
– There is a user who wishes to know whether his password digest is easy-to-crack.
We suppose that auditing in both the scenarios is performed with the help of an external
auditor who may be malicious and that auditing is restricted to verifying whether provided
password digests contain weak ones. We also suppose that the auditor performs a dictionary
based password cracking, i.e. the auditor checks whether a password digest corresponds to the
digest of a word in the given dictionary (or a set of dictionaries).
Privacy guarantees. In addition to the fact that the user or system digests are not revealed
to the auditor, the external auditor himself may not wish to reveal the dictionaries he uses for
password auditing. This is usually the case for proprietary tools. Hence, PPA simultaneously
ensures privacy for both the system administrator/user and the auditor. The digest(s) hence
remain private to the user/administrator and symmetrically, the dictionaries used for auditing
remain private to the auditor.
In the following, we present construction of a PPA tool that relies on a primitive called
Private Set Intersection and its variant. The construction can be seen as an application of
private set intersection in password auditing. We succinctly present private set intersection
protocols and in the sequel we present its variant called Private Set Intersection Cardinality.
For each primitive, we discuss its applicability to private password auditing.
3.1 PPA based on Private Set Intersection
Private Set Intersection (PSI) considers the problem of computing the intersection of pri-
vate datasets of two parties. The scenario consists of two sets U = {u1, . . . , um}, where
ui ∈ {0, 1}` and DB = {v1, . . . , vn}, where vi ∈ {0, 1}` held by a user and the database-
owner respectively. The goal of the user is to privately retrieve the set U ∩ DB. The privacy
requirement of the scheme consists in keeping U and DB private to their respective owner.
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There is an abounding literature on novel and computationally efficient PSI protocols. The
general conclusion being that for security of 80 bits, protocol by De Cristofaro et al. [4] per-
forms better than all other protocols, while for higher security levels, other protocols supersede
the protocol by De Cristofaro et al.
PSI provides a primitive to design a PPA tool in the first scenario where a system admin-
istrator has a list of system digests and wishes to know the digests which correspond to weak
passwords. We suppose that the auditor has a dictionary of weak digests DB = {w1, . . . , wn}
and the administrator owns the digest set U = {d1, . . . , dm}. Then by invoking a PSI protocol
on the sets, the administrator may know the digests which are easy-to-crack. The security of
PSI ensures that the sets remain private to their respective owner.
3.2 PPA based on Private Set Intersection Cardinality
Private Set Intersection Cardinality (PSI-CA) is a variant of PSI where the goal of the client is
to privately retrieve the cardinality of the intersection rather than the contents. While generic
PSI immediately provide a solution to PSI-CA, they however yield too much information.
While several PSI-CA protocols have been proposed, we concentrate on PSI-CA protocol of
De Cristofaro et al. [3], as it is the most efficient.
PSI-CA builds a PPA primitive in the single digest scenario, where a user wishes to know
if his password is weak with respect to the existing dictionaries. As earlier, the auditor has a
dictionary of digests DB = {w1, . . . , wn} and the user owns a digest d. Clearly, invoking an
instance of PSI-CA protocol on the sets, the user may privately know if his password digest is
easy-to-crack: if the intersection set is of cardinality 1, then the password digest is weak. The
security of PSI-CA again ensures that data remain private to their respective owner.
4 Practicality of PPA Tool
We implemented the PSI protocol by DeCristofaro et al. [4] and the PSI-CA protocol of [3],
since they are the most efficient. Recommended parameters of |p| = 1024 and |q| = 160 bits
have been used for PSI-CA, while an RSA modulus of 1024 bits has been considered for PSI.
For both the primitives, SHA-1 hash function has used for signatures. These parameters ensure
a security of 80 bits in the semi-honest adversary model.
We evaluated PPA tools based on these protocols and compared their performance with
Blackhash. The tests were performed on a 64-bit processor desktop computer powered by an
Intel Xeon E5410 3520M processor at 2.33 GHz with 6 MB cache, 8 GB RAM
and running 3.2.0-58-generic-pae Linux. We have used GCC 4.6.3 with -O3
optimization flag. The implementation uses GMP library4 v4.2.1.
For Blackhash and PSI based tool, we fix the number of system digests to be 59, 169.
This corresponds to a representative data provided with the Blackhash source code. In order
to evaluate the performance of the techniques, we tested these implementations against real-
world dictionaries of varied sizes, from 100 entries up to 14 million entries. The dictionaries
are presented in Table 1a.
Table 1b presents the results obtained for SHA-1 password digests. We observe that while
Blackhash is not privacy-friendly, it is the most efficient. This is due to the time efficiency of
the underlying Bloom filters. PPA tool based on PSI-CA is faster than Blackhash for smaller
4 https://gmplib.org/
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John the Ripper (JtR) 3107
Xato Top-10k (Xato) 10,000
Cain & Abel (C&A) 306,706
Dazzlepod 2,151,220
RockYou 14,344,391
(b) Cost incurred by different auditing tools.
Time
Tool Top-100 JtR Xato C&A Dazzle. RockYou
Blackhash [1] 6s 6s 6s 15s 1m 2m
PPA
PSI-CA [3] 47ms 359ms 1s 28s 3m 23m
PSI [4] 1m 1m 2m 6m 37m 4h
dictionaries since PSI-CA considers only one digest. Moreover, even for moderately large dic-
tionaries (2M), the audit time remains very practical, i.e. 3 mins. PSI based tool incurs consid-
erable cost for large dictionaries. In fact, both PSI and PSI-CA based private auditing against
very large dictionaries are suitable in the settings where password auditing is not supposed to
be instantaneous, which usually is the case. Indeed a security audit may last for days.
5 Conclusion
In this work, we discussed the issues faced by system administrators in face with malicious
auditors. The existing password auditing tools essentially require the system administrator or
the user to reveal weak passwords. While password auditing tools like Blackhash may prevent
pass-the-hash attacks, they are yet susceptible to revealing weak passwords to the auditor. Con-
sidering the extreme sensitivity of passwords, more secure means must be deployed to ensure
the privacy of passwords. To this end, we provide a private password auditing tool which does
not require the user to reveal the password digests to the external auditor. Symmetrically, the
auditor keeps his dictionaries private. The tool is based on private set intersection and its vari-
ants. An evaluation reveals that privacy friendly tools are practical in scenarios where password
auditing is not instantaneous (which usually is the case). We highlight that the primitives used
in PPA require heavy public key operations, a future work consists in designing efficient and
dedicated PPA protocols relying only on symmetric cryptographic primitives.
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